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Abstract
It has been argued that there is something morally objectionable about moral realism: for
instance, according to realism, we are justified in believing that genocide is wrong only if
a certain moral fact obtains, but it is objectionable to hold our moral commitments
hostage to metaphysics in this way. In this paper, I argue that no version of this moral
argument against realism is likely to succeed. More precisely, minimal realism―the kind
of realism on which realist theses are understood as internal to moral discourse―is
immune to this challenge, contrary to what some proponents of the moral argument have
suggested, while robust non-naturalist realists might have good answers to all versions of
the argument as well, at least if they adopt a certain stance on how to form metaphysical
beliefs in the moral domain.
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1 Introduction
Moral realism―the view that there are objective moral facts, to which we have reliable
access―is often defended with moral arguments. Only realism, it is argued, can make good
on commitments that we hold most dear, e.g. that genocide is wrong no matter what anyone
thinks about it, while anti-realist views such as subjectivism or relativism have unpalatable
consequences with respect to such first-order moral issues, so we have moral reason to accept
realism. However, some philosophers have argued that there is something morally objection-
able about realism itself. According to realism, for instance, we are justified in believing that
genocide is wrong only if a certain moral fact obtains. So, if we discovered that there was no
such fact, or that the moral facts were different, we would have to abandon our belief that
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genocide is wrong. But we should not hold our moral commitments hostage to metaphysics in
this way. Or so the argument goes.1
A version of this worry was first raised by Blackburn (1993): those who insist that morality
must have a metaphysical grounding, he argued, exhibit a defective sensibility, similar to the
moral flaw involved in believing that nothing matters unless it matters to God. More recently,
Erdur (2016), Hayward (2019), Bedke (2019) and Kremm (2019) have developed this
argument in several directions, focusing on different connections that realists seem to posit
between moral facts and our moral commitments.2 For instance, Erdur argues that the moral
explanations offered by realists involve an independent moral reality in a problematic way,
while Bedke and Kremm hold that realism is objectionable because it allows for revising our
moral beliefs on purely non-moral, metaphysical grounds.
The different versions of this argument also vary with respect to their targets. Here we need
to distinguish two versions of realism. Minimal realism is the kind of realism defended by
Kramer (2009), Dworkin (2011), or Scanlon (2014), which interprets realist theses about moral
truths and facts as internal to moral discourse, by relying on a deflationary account of these
notions. On this view, for instance, the seemingly metaphysical claim that it is a fact that
genocide is wrong is equivalent to the first-order moral claim that genocide is wrong.3 In
contrast, robust non-naturalist realism holds that claims about moral facts and properties have
genuine metaphysical content and are thus irreducible to mere moral verdicts. Erdur and
Hayward take their arguments to undermine both of these versions of realism,4 while Bedke
and Kremm target only robust realism, and Kremm suggests that his moral challenge to robust
realism might even be a good reason to adopt minimal realism instead.5
In this paper, I will argue that no version of the moral argument against realism is likely to
succeed. More precisely, minimal realism is indeed immune to this challenge, contrary to what
Erdur and Hayward have suggested, while robust realists might have good answers to all
versions of this argument as well, at least if they adopt a certain stance on how we should form
metaphysical beliefs in the moral domain. I will end with some remarks on where this leaves
the dispute between minimal and robust realism.
1 I focus on moral realism in this paper, following some proponents of this argument, but the discussion below
can be extended to normative realism more broadly.
2 Field (2009, p. 270) makes a similar point in passing: “I’m tempted to say that the moral realist has not only a
dubious metaphysics, but also a dubious morality that allows torturing dogs under the condition that there are no
straightforward moral facts, or under the condition that those moral facts permit or even require such torture.”
3 This version of realism is sometimes called relaxed or quietist realism, and some proponents of the view might
reject the minimal label that I use here. Scanlon (2014), for instance, argues that his realism is not “minimalist,”
because it takes normative facts to be as robust as they can be, and gives normative statements “exactly the
content and ‘thickness’ that they require when taken literally” (p. 28). However, I do not think that there is any
substantive disagreement here: minimalism aims to capture precisely the ordinary meaning of terms like true and
fact, and entails indeed that truths and facts understood in a minimalist way are as robust as they can intelligibly
be. Another thing to note is that minimal realism might include the expressivist quasi-realism defended by
Blackburn (1993) and Gibbard (2003), which also relies on a minimalist account of truth, fact, and other notions
to make good on realist-sounding claims about normativity. Blackburn and Gibbard advertise their view as a
sophisticated form of anti-realism, but a case might be made that there is no meaningful divide between quasi-
realism and minimal realism. I will not a take a stance on this issue here.
4 See Erdur (2016), pp. 598–599, and Hayward (2019), pp. 909–910. I should note that Hayward actually doubts
that minimal realism is a coherent view. What he argues is that, if this version of realism is coherent, then his
moral challenge applies to it as well. I will also assume here that this view is coherent and a form of genuine
realism.
5 Naturalist realism has been largely ignored in this debate, so I will also set it aside. From here on, robust realism
should be understood as referring to robust non-naturalist realism.
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2 The Argument from Objectionable Counterfactuals
Let me begin with what I take to be the least effective version of the moral challenge to
realism, namely an argument from objectionable counterfactuals. The very proponents of this
argument acknowledge that it runs into an important problem, but it is useful to see what this
problem is and how it motivates more interesting challenges to realism.
According to this argument, realism is morally objectionable because it is committed to
claims like the following: if the moral facts were different or inexistent, then genocide would
not be wrong. Here is how Erdur (2016, p. 597) initially articulates her complaint against
realism:
“What if genocide and slavery involved all the pain and suffering they involve, but there
were no independent reality that dictated that they were wrong—would they then not be
wrong? Is not the proper thing to say rather that genocide and slavery would be wrong
even if there were no independent reality that dictated that they were wrong?”
Similarly, Hayward (2019) takes to realism to entail that, if there were no moral facts, then
nothing would matter—a claim that he finds morally offensive. Erdur and Hayward take this
argument to undermine both robust and minimal realism.
However, minimal realism is immune to this argument, because it treats seemingly
metaphysical claims about moral facts as equivalent to first-order moral commitments, by
relying on a minimalist account of facthood and other related notions. On this view, to say that
it is a fact that genocide is wrong, or that there is an independent reality that makes it the case
that genocide is wrong, amounts to nothing more than rehearsing the verdict that genocide is
wrong. Therefore, the claim that “If there were no independent reality that dictated that
genocide was wrong, then genocide would not be wrong” is equivalent to “If genocide was
not wrong, it would not be wrong,” which is trivially true, rather than a substantive claim that
someone could challenge on moral grounds.
Robust realism might seem to be a better target for this argument. Realists such as Shafer-
Landau (2003) or Enoch (2011) hold that there are genuine metaphysical claims about, e.g.,
the existence of objective moral facts, which cannot be reduced to first-order moral claims.
Therefore, such realists cannot trivialize the relevant counterfactuals in the way that minimal
realists can: on their view, for instance, to suppose that there was no independent reality that
made it the case that genocide was wrong is conceptually distinct from supposing that
genocide was not wrong.
Robust realists can make a different case, however, that the counterfactuals involved in the
moral argument are trivially true and therefore pose no threat to their view. Moral facts, or
more precisely fundamentalmoral facts, are supposed to be metaphysically necessary. And if it
is metaphysically impossible that the moral facts were different, then a claim such as “If there
was no moral fact that made it the case that genocide was wrong, then genocide would not be
wrong” would indeed be true, but so would a counterfactual with same antecedent and the
opposite consequent, at least according to a standard semantics for counterfactuals with
impossible antecedents. Such counterfactuals, therefore, cannot tell us much about the plau-
sibility of robust realism.
If we focus on non-fundamental moral facts, on the other hand—i.e., facts that obtain in
virtue of fundamental moral facts together with some relevant non-moral features of the
world—then it is true that such facts could have been different, but only if the natural facts
on which they supervene had been different as well. For example, if I had not made a promise
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to my friend yesterday, then there would have been no moral fact dictating that I must keep my
promise to her, so I would not have had this moral duty. But there is nothing troubling about
such counterfactuals: our moral commitments should be conditional on any relevant non-moral
facts.
To sum up, robust realism typically does not allow that moral facts could have been
different or inexistent while everything else about the world stayed the same,6 and this seems
enough to make it immune to the argument from counterfactuals, as it can treat all relevant
counterfactuals as either trivially true or benign.
Both Erdur and Hayward acknowledge the problem that the metaphysical necessity of
moral facts poses for their arguments. In response, Erdur suggests that her moral challenge
does not essentially rely on any claim about possible worlds, but rather concerns moral
explanations. I turn to this version of the argument next. Hayward claims that we can morally
evaluate people’s attitudes towards metaphysically impossible scenarios, but he too primarily
uses a different argument against realism, centered on epistemic possibility. I believe that this
argument is indeed a more promising version of the moral challenge to realism, and will
examine it in section 4.7
3 The Argument from Objectionable Explanations
Erdur’s argument from objectionable explanations against realism is modeled on similar
arguments that are often made against anti-realist theories of morality. For instance, moral
subjectivism seems to entail that slavery and genocide are wrong ultimately because we have
certain negative attitudes towards them, which is arguably a moral misjudgment: slavery and
genocide are wrong because of, say, all the suffering and loss that they involve, and not
because we disapprove of them.
Similarly, Erdur argues, moral realism holds that what makes an action right or wrong is
ultimately the fact that there is an independent reality that makes it right or wrong, and this
claim should be rejected on moral grounds:
“[S]urely, the existence of an independently issued verdict—if there were such a
verdict—that genocide is wrong would not be the main or ultimate reason why it is
wrong. Genocide is wrong mainly and ultimately because of the pain and suffering and
loss that it involves—regardless of whether or not the badness of such suffering and loss
is confirmed by an independent reality.” (Erdur 2016, pp. 597-598, her italics)
6 I say “typically” to allow for the possibility of realists who reject supervenience.
7 Someone might object that my dismissal of the argument from counterfactuals has been too quick: some
counterfactuals with impossible antecedents are more plausible than others, it might be argued, and the right
semantics for counterfactuals should accommodate this fact, rather than treating all such counterfactuals as
trivially true. Moreover, as an anonymous reviewer points out, this objection is strengthened if we consider that a
theist might similarly argue that we should not worry about making our moral commitments conditional on
God’s commands because it is metaphysically necessary that God exists and issues those commands, without
intuitively addressing the moral complaint against the Divine Command Theory. I cannot properly engage with
the question of counterfactuals with impossible antecedents here, but I believe we can reasonably set aside the
argument from objectionable counterfactuals, given the availability of other versions of the moral argument
against realism, which seem to capture the same intuitive complaint and leave the realist with no easy way to
trivialize the issue.
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Once again, Erdur takes this argument to undermine not only robust realism, but also minimal
realism: both views, she argues, are committed to the existence of independent or objective
moral facts and take such facts to play a fundamental role in moral explanations.
However, minimal realists do not claim that moral explanations bottom out in general
claims about the existence of objective facts, or even in specific objectivist commitments. And
for good reason: for instance, neither “Genocide is wrong because there are objective moral
facts,” nor “Genocide is wrong because it is wrong no matter what anyone thinks about it”
would be much of an explanation. Minimal realists do embrace moral objectivity, but as the
result of substantive moral theorizing, rather than its starting point.8 When it comes to moral
explanations, then, minimal realists can appeal to the same explanantia that Erdur favors. For
instance, they can agree that it is ultimately the suffering and loss involved in genocide that
make it wrong, rather than the existence of objective moral facts or the objective wrongness of
genocide itself.
What about robust realism? Again, it might seem to be more vulnerable to Erdur’s
challenge. The core metaphysical tenets of robust realism are meant to be irreducible to
ordinary moral commitments. Moreover, robust realists might indeed appeal to such meta-
physical claims about moral facts and properties in order to offer deep explanations for moral
truths. For example, we might expect a robust realist to endorse an explanation like the
following: “Genocide is wrong” is true because there is an objective fact that makes it true.
It is such metaphysical explanations that Erdur finds morally objectionable:
“Does it really make moral sense to take some peculiar metaphysical truth about the
world (which is devoid of any moral content itself, as we have assumed) as the ultimate
reason why we are justified in taking our judgments about genocide or slavery seriously,
and standing our ground in such matters?” (Erdur 2016, p. 601)
In other words, her argument is that moral explanations should bottom out in morally relevant
features of the world, and not in morally neutral metaphysical facts.
Robust realists can resist this argument in several ways. First, let us assume that such
realists do propose metaphysical explanations of first-order moral truths, and these explana-
tions involve moral facts or properties in a fundamental role. Now, why should we think of
these moral entities as morally neutral or “devoid of any moral content,” as Erdur characterizes
them? The existence of an objective moral fact that makes it the case that genocide is wrong, it
might be argued, is as morally significant as any feature of the world could be, and to assume
that moral metaphysics is morally irrelevant is simply to beg the question against robust
realism.9
Robust realists can also attempt to explain away the intuitions that drive Erdur’s argument
by distinguishing between moral and metaphysical explanations. Perhaps the existence of an
objective moral fact is indeed the wrong kind of explanans to invoke in a first-order moral
explanation of why genocide is wrong, which should appeal instead to such features of
genocide as the suffering and loss that it causes. But once we go beyond first-order moral
theorizing and look for a deeper explanation of morality, including for why certain moral
8 As Dworkin (2011, p. 10) puts it: “The only intelligible case for the ‘mind-independence’ of some moral
judgment is a moral argument showing that it would still be true even if no one thought it was.”
9 Admittedly, someone might object that this response itself begs the question against Erdur’s challenge, by
taking for granted that non-natural facts are morally relevant. Cf. Dasgupta (2017), pp. 300–304, who argues that
non-naturalists do not “play fair” if they build normative significance into the very definition of normative
properties.
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explanations hold, the robust realist might argue, it is wholly appropriate to appeal to moral
facts and properties in a fundamental explanatory role.10
These are some responses available to realists whose explanatory ambitions match Erdur’s
characterization of robust realism. But there is yet another way to resist Erdur’s argument:
robust realism need not purport to offer metaphysical explanations that go beyond first-order
moral explanations, and which involve metaphysical facts in a fundamental role. Instead,
robust realists might simply claim that moral explanations themselves are metaphysical
explanations, without adding any problematic explanantia to them. For example, such realists
could agree with Erdur that genocide is wrong ultimately in virtue of the suffering and loss that
it involves, and not because there is some further metaphysical fact that makes it wrong. Their
realism would be manifested, at least in part, in how they interpret such moral explanations,
e.g. as capturing grounding relations that are part of the metaphysical structure of the world.11
In conclusion, robust realists can answer Erdur’s explanatory challenge no matter how they
construe the relation between moral and metaphysical explanations. Let me turn now to what I
take to be the most promising versions of the moral argument against realism: an argument
from epistemic possibility and a related argument centered on the methodological commit-
ments of robust realism.
4 The Argument from Epistemic Possibility
Moral realism seems to entail that, if the moral facts turn out to be sufficiently different or
inexistent, then our moral beliefs are wrong. Moreover, the antecedent of this conditional is an
epistemic possibility that realists should take seriously, given that realism is standardly
understood as allowing that we might be fundamentally wrong about what the moral facts are.
Some philosophers have argued that it is morally objectionable to hold our moral commit-
ments hostage to beliefs about the moral facts in this way. Thus, Hayward (2019) holds that
realism is morally offensive because it entails that, if there are no objective moral facts, then
nothing matters, in the same way that, say, the Divine Command Theory of morality is
objectionable because it makes our moral commitments hinge on God’s existence. Similarly,
Bedke (2019) argues that, insofar as realists are disposed to revise their beliefs on important
moral issues upon discovering that the moral facts are different, this is an objectionable
disposition to have.
Note that Hayward’s target is realism itself and what it entails, while Bedke focuses on the
psychology of those who accept realism. We should keep this in mind as we examine possible
realist responses to this challenge. The arguments also focus on slightly different epistemic
possibilities: discovering that there are no objective moral facts vs. discovering that the facts
are different than we thought. However, I do not think much hinges on this, so I will just talk
about the disjunctive possibility that the moral facts might be different or inexistent in what
10 Blanchard (2019) offers precisely this response to Erdur: as he puts it, Erdur’s explanatory argument relies on
“an equivocation between the normative and metaethical ‘why’ and ‘because’. As grounds for the wrongness of
genocide, pain and suffering are not competitors with the dictate of an independent reality. Rather, the realist
view is that the ultimate normative grounds for the wrongness of genocide are to be understood metaphysically as
constituted by an independent reality.” (p. 4) See also Horn (2020) and Enoch (forthcoming) for similar
arguments.
11 Note that a distinction can still be drawn between robust realism thus understood and minimal realism, insofar
as the latter holds that moral explanations do not have substantive metaphysical content.
C. Golub
follows. Finally, while Bedke’s argument explicitly targets only robust non-naturalist realism,
in virtue of its robust metaphysical commitments, Hayward holds that his argument extends to
minimal realism as well.
Let me start, then, with minimal realism, which again can be easily shown to be immune to
this challenge. For a minimal realist, there is no difference between supposing that we might be
wrong in our beliefs about objective moral facts and supposing that our first-order moral
beliefs might be wrong. For instance, discovering that there is no fact that makes it true that
genocide is wrong is simply to discover that genocide is not wrong. If we do make this (very
unlikely!) discovery, this should make us abandon the belief that genocide is wrong. This
much should be uncontroversial: if it turns out that not-p, then we should not believe that p, at
least in normal circumstances. This is not a substantive dependence claim to which someone
can raise moral objections, but a matter of basic epistemic rationality.
At times, Hayward suggests that realism is objectionable simply because it allows that even
our deepest moral commitments might in principle be mistaken, e.g. even while holding fixed
all our other beliefs about the world, we might discover that we should not comfort a loved one
who is in distress. But making sense of the possibility of fundamental error is usually seen as a
desideratum for any view worth calling realism. Both minimal and robust realism do entail
that we might in principle be correct about all the natural facts and yet be wrong in our moral
beliefs, but this is just part of what it is to be a realist. If the argument from epistemic
possibility reduces to complaining about this feature of realism, then it is not covering new
terrain, but is merely the expression of a fundamental disagreement between realists and anti-
realists. In any case, this issue has little to do with any objectionable dependence relation
between our beliefs and some separate domain of facts, at least when it comes to minimal
realism.12
Once again, robust realism might seem to be at greater risk in the face of this argument from
epistemic possibility. Robust realism seems to be committed to there being some “extra
metaphysics beyond the natural ways of the world” (Bedke 2019, p. 2) on which our moral
commitments are conditional, such that discovering that this independent metaphysical reality
was different or inexistent could undermine said commitments. But such metaphysical dis-
coveries should make no difference to our first-order moral beliefs. Or so the argument goes.
It is important to note what this argument does not say. Hayward and Bedke do not claim
that all non-moral discoveries are irrelevant to our moral commitments. Some non-moral
factual questions, e.g. whether a fetus can feel pain, can clearly be relevant to our moral beliefs.
Moreover, even our fundamental moral commitments might hinge on non-moral facts, includ-
ing metaphysical facts: learning that there is no external world might be enough to conclude
that no action is morally wrong, not even genocide. But there are also bad cases where certain
non-moral facts should not influence our moral beliefs: for instance, learning that a prospective
tenant is gay is irrelevant to whether one ought to lend an apartment to that person. The
argument from epistemic possibility claims that the metaphysical discovery that the moral facts
are different or inexistent belongs with the bad cases: it is the kind of non-moral evidence that
should not influence our moral commitments, contrary to what realism entails.
12 This is not to say that allowing for the possibility of fundamental moral error poses no problem for realism.
Even some self-described realists, e.g. Nagel (1986), reject the idea that moral truths could radically outstrip our
capacity to discover them. But whatever problem realists might face here, it is different, I take it, from the
complaint that realism holds our moral commitments hostage to metaphysics.
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First, let me discuss some responses that realists have offered to this challenge which I do
not find successful.
FitzPatrick (2018) has responded to an early version of this challenge by denying that being
a realist entails being disposed to revise one’s moral commitments upon making certain
metaphysical discoveries. If a realist came to believe that there are no non-natural moral facts,
FitzPatrick argues, he could still hold on to his moral commitments, and abandon instead the
belief that such moral commitments need a metaphysical foundation in non-natural facts. For
instance, such a person might try to vindicate the apparent objectivity and categorical force of
his moral beliefs by becoming a naturalist realist instead, or perhaps by adopting a sophisti-
cated version of anti-realism that allows for some measure of moral objectivity.13
This response, however, is not much of a defense of realism. What it offers is the prospect
that one will abandon realism in certain circumstances in order to preserve one’s moral
probity. At best, this might be a good response to Bedke’s version of the challenge, which
targets the realists’ psychology, but it does little to address Hayward’s complaint that realism
itself has morally objectionable consequences. Indeed, FitzPatrick’s move seems to support
Hayward’s argument, by conceding that, if we were to make certain metaphysical discoveries,
we would have to choose between accepting realism and preserving our moral commitments.
Moreover, FitzPatrick’s response might not even work as a defense of the realists’
psychological dispositions: while realists might be willing to jump ship and adopt other
metaethical views upon making certain metaphysical discoveries, their current acceptance of
realism can still be challenged on moral grounds, insofar as realism has morally objectionable
consequences of which they are aware.14
Perhaps, though, realists have a different option here: they might deny that realism entails
that we should abandon our moral beliefs upon making certain metaphysical discoveries. This
is the line taken by Blanchard (2019):
“[I]t would be objectionable that someone would commit themselves to abandoning
first-order moral commitments conditional on coming to believe that realism is false, but
such a commitment is not constitutive of being a realist.” (p. 6)
According to Blanchard, while realists appeal to the existence of objective facts in order to
make sense of their moral commitments, and this might lead them to hold that, if realism turns
out to be false, then they should abandon those moral commitments, the latter claim is not
entailed by realism; it is simply what some realists happen to believe.15
However, I do not see how the claim that the justification of our moral commitments
depends on the existence of objective moral facts can be separated from realism itself.
Realism, I take it, is not only a set of metaphysical claims about the existence of moral
13 Enoch (forthcoming) offers a similar response to Bedke and Hayward. Even if realists accept conditionals such
as “If there are no non-natural properties, then no action is wrong,” he argues, they need not be committed to
using such conditionals in modus-ponens inferences upon coming to believe their antecedents; in such circum-
stances, they can cease to accept these conditionals.
14 Cf. Field (2009): “I don’t believe the point is adequately answered by noting that an erstwhile realist who
discovered there to be no straightforward normative facts would almost certainly continue with those moral
preferences, and give up her view that she must base moral preferences on beliefs about such facts. For it’s still
the case that while she’s a realist she has those conditional preferences; and those conditional preferences strike
me as morally objectionable.” (fn. 23, p. 270)
15 In making this argument, Blanchard focuses on the commitment to stand one’s ground in moral disagreements,
but I take it that his argument is meant to concern the resilience of our moral commitments more generally,
whether or not this resilience is manifested in the context of moral disagreements.
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facts or properties, but also includes certain bridge principles connecting such metaphys-
ical claims with first-order moral claims: e.g., if there is no objective fact that makes it
the case that genocide is wrong, then genocide is not wrong. Indeed, the metaphysical
theses of realism are typically defended by appealing to the objectionable moral conse-
quences of supposing that there are no objective moral facts. So realism does seem to
entail that, if the metaphysical facts turn out to be different, then our current moral
beliefs are false, e.g. genocide is not wrong.
Now, it is true that the question of whether genocide is wrong is, strictly speaking, distinct
from the question of whether we should believe that genocide is wrong, or from the question of
when it would be appropriate to abandon this belief. Perhaps there are practical reasons to
continue believing that genocide is wrong even upon discovering that genocide is not wrong.
But even so, realism does entail that, if there is no objective fact that makes it the case that
genocide is wrong, then genocide is not wrong, and therefore, as a matter of basic epistemic
rationality, we should not believe that genocide is wrong. This is all that the argument from
epistemic possibility needs to get off the ground.16
Here is how I believe robust realists should respond to this argument from epistemic
possibility: by arguing that the only kind of evidence that could support believing that
the moral facts are different, and thus lead us to revise our moral commitments, is the
same type of evidence that would support revising our moral beliefs in the first place.
Aside from first-order moral evidence, this might include higher-order evidence about
one’s moral beliefs, or considerations about the simplicity and explanatory power of
one’s moral views. If realists were to adopt this methodological stance on the right way
to form metaphysical beliefs about moral facts, they could hold that it is not epistemi-
cally possible for the moral facts to substantially diverge from our moral commitments,
at least if our beliefs are formed through the right kind of process. Any situation in which
it would be epistemically rational to believe that the moral facts are different or
inexistent would be a case where we are already justified to some extent in revising
our moral beliefs accordingly.
Now, it is not obvious that robust realists can adopt this methodological stance.
Indeed, another version of the moral argument focuses precisely on the question of what
kind of evidence robust realism treats as relevant for our moral commitments: realism,
the argument goes, objectionably entails that we could settle first-order moral questions
based on purely metaphysical evidence. Therefore, whether or not the response I
suggested above succeeds depends on whether realists can address this deeper method-
ological challenge, which is the focus of the next section.
16 Jessica Isserow has suggested to me in personal communication that realists might be able to dodge the
argument from epistemic possibility by adopting the view that fundamental moral truths are conceptual truths,
knowable a priori. See, e.g., Cuneo and Shafer-Landau (2014). On this view, she says, there would be “some
kind of a priori insurance against discovering that at least a certain class of our moral commitments are radically
false”. However, I do not think this is a promising response to the challenge, not only because I find the view
independently implausible (for reasons I will not discuss here), but also because I do not think it would really get
realists off the hook in the face of the argument from epistemic possibility. As long as realists allow—as they
should!—that we might be wrong about what the relevant conceptual truths are, this will be enough to get a new
version of the argument from epistemic possibility off the ground, centered on conditionals such as: “If it turns
out that ‘Pain is bad’ is not a conceptual moral truth, then...”
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5 The Methodological Argument
Bedke (2019) and Kremm (2019) argue that robust realism faces a moral problem due to its
methodological commitments: given that such realists treat metaphysical claims about moral
facts as irreducible to first-order moral claims, they must allow that there is some purely non-
moral evidence or way of reasoning that would support believing that the moral facts are
different or inexistent, and thus make it rational to revise or abandon our moral beliefs. But
holding our moral commitments hostage to purely non-moral, metaphysical evidence is an
objectionable way of forming moral beliefs. Or so the argument goes.
This argument cuts deeper than the argument from epistemic possibility: it does not just
claim that we should not hold our moral beliefs hostage to metaphysical beliefs about the
moral facts. It purports to explain why we should not do so, namely because metaphysical
beliefs can be rationally supported by types of evidence that would be improper evidence for
moral beliefs.
What kind of evidence could this be? Bedke offers a far-fetched example: if realism were
true, he argues, then we could in principle learn from an oracle that the instantiation of moral
properties in the world is different than we had taken it to be, which should then lead us to
revise our moral commitments accordingly, on pain of irrationality.17
I do not find this example particularly effective, because it relies on pure testimony as a
possible source of evidence for metaphysical beliefs. There is a lively debate in metaethics
about whether we could ever form justified moral beliefs or gain moral knowledge by pure
testimony, and it might be argued that similar issues arise for metaphysical beliefs about
morality: perhaps Bedke’s oracle is not just actually unavailable as a source of evidence for
metaphysical beliefs about moral facts, but nothing like it could in principle provide such
evidence.
Now, I have only expressed some suspicions about Bedke’s example and pure testimony in
metaphysics, not an actual argument. Moreover, the issue of pure testimony might seem to be a
red herring here. Bedke’s more general point is that robust realism, by its nature, must allow
for certain kinds of non-moral evidence for metaphysical beliefs, which would be improper
evidence for moral beliefs, and this argument can still stand even if we dismiss pure testimony
as a source of evidence for metaphysical beliefs.
Kremm offers more plausible examples of what the relevant problematic evidence might
be, namely theoretical considerations that seem to be specific to metaphysical inquiry: e.g.,
considerations regarding ontological parsimony, how moral facts fit into our broader meta-
physical picture of the world, or epistemological considerations about our access to moral
facts.18 We cannot legitimately revise our moral beliefs on the basis of such evidence, he
argues.
In responding to this methodological argument, let me start with the obvious: minimal
realism is entirely immune to this challenge. On this view, metaphysical beliefs about moral
facts etc. are first-order moral beliefs, so it is trivially the case that evidence about what the
moral facts are is evidence for our moral beliefs. And to be clear, neither Bedke nor Kremm
claims that minimal realism has anything to worry about here. Indeed, Kremm suggests that
17 Hayward (2019, p. 910) uses a similar example in passing, and so does Donelson (2017) in his argument that
metaethics should be irrelevant in moral deliberation.
18 Hayward (2019, p. 906) similarly argues that considerations of parsimony and explanatory power should be
irrelevant to our moral beliefs.
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this methodological challenge to robust realism might be a good argument for minimal
realism.
What about robust realism? Here is the thought that I want to explore, which I already
suggested as a response to the argument from epistemic possibility: robust realists might claim
that, even though metaphysical beliefs about moral facts are conceptually distinct from first-
order moral beliefs, they are supported by the same kind of evidence, and moreover, cannot be
supported by different types of evidence. To be sure, I am not saying that all or most actual
robust realists would endorse such a claim. But this response to the methodological challenge
would be consistent, I believe, with the core theses of robust realism: (1) there are objective
normative facts, to which we have reliable access; and (2) all realist talk of normative facts,
properties, etc. should be understood in a robust metaphysical sense.
The idea that there need be no methodological gap between our moral and metaphysical
beliefs might seem to go against the very definition of robust realism. If robust realists treat
metaphysical beliefs about moral facts as irreducible to mere moral beliefs, must they not allow
for the existence of information that is epistemically relevant for our metaphysical commit-
ments and thereby for our moral commitments, but which is also not the kind of information
relevant in ordinary moral reasoning?
I do not think so. While accepting such a methodological gap between moral and meta-
physical beliefs is certainly compatible with robust realism, I do not see why it should be
treated as an intrinsic feature of the view.
Here is a broad picture of the relation between moral beliefs and metaphysical beliefs about
the moral domain that I believe robust realists can endorse. We have all sorts of evidence for
our moral beliefs: not only straightforwardly moral evidence, but also higher-order evidence
about our moral beliefs, epistemological considerations, evidence about how these beliefs fit
with our other beliefs about the world, or considerations about the simplicity and explanatory
power of our moral views. (Think about disputes in fundamental moral theory, where such
theoretical virtues often play a role.)19 In addition to ordinary moral beliefs, we also form
beliefs about the moral facts and properties underlying our moral commitments. We need to
treat these other beliefs as having genuine metaphysical weight, and not just as mere moral
beliefs in disguise, in order to be justified in treating our moral commitments as objective and
categorical.20 But this does not mean that said metaphysical beliefs are about a different
domain of facts than moral beliefs: they are, after all, beliefs about moral facts, properties, etc.
Nor does it mean that these metaphysical beliefs could be supported by a different kind of
evidence than moral beliefs: they are, and can only be, supported by first-order moral evidence,
epistemological considerations and higher-order evidence about our beliefs, evidence about
19 As I mentioned in fn. 19, Hayward argues that one problem with realism is that it treats considerations about
parsimony and explanatory power as relevant to moral questions: “I think our norms of moral evidence legislate
that these considerations could not in principle be relevant to the question of whether I ought to comfort my ailing
partner, or whether anything matters” (2019, p. 906). However, this complaint relies on an overly narrow
construal of moral inquiry and morally relevant evidence. Theoretical considerations about simplicity and
explanatory power might not be salient in ordinary moral contexts, and might not be sufficient on their own to
overturn the moral commitments that we hold most dear. But such considerations can play a role in fundamental
moral theory, e.g. in a dispute between Kantian deontologists and Ross-style pluralists.
20 An anonymous reviewer notes that this idea that claims about moral facts and properties have genuine
metaphysical weight is not entirely clear. I agree, and more generally I believe it is not easy to articulate a stable
divide between robust and minimal realism, given that minimal realists do not rejectmetaphysical talk, but rather
reintepret it as internal to moral discourse. But I am assuming that we can make sense of this divide, at least for
the purposes of this paper. More on the dispute between minimal and robust realism, in the concluding section.
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how our beliefs fit with our scientific understanding of the world or about the simplicity and
explanatory power of our beliefs, where all such evidence concerns both our moral beliefs and
our metaphysical beliefs about the moral domain. In other words, moral metaphysics is a
natural extension of moral theory, which does not involve any significantly different
methodology.
By adopting this picture of the moral domain, I believe robust realists can successfully
address the methodological argument. Take the belief that it is an objective fact that we ought
to keep our promises, understood as having robust metaphysical content, and the first-order
belief that we ought to keep our promises. The types of evidence relevant for the two beliefs
are the same, the realist can argue, and they include both straightforwardly moral evidence and
more theoretical considerations which are typically associated with metaphysical inquiry. This
is not to say that the specific evidence relevant to each belief will necessarily be the same: for
instance, parsimony considerations might weigh more in a metaphysical context than in a
purely moral one. However, what matters is that robust realism thus understood will not entail
that we could end up revising or abandoning our moral beliefs on the basis of improper
evidence. The only kind of evidence that could ever lead us to think that the moral facts are
different than we had thought, the realist can say, is the same type of evidence that we
routinely use in moral inquiry, extended to metaphysical questions.21 All of this, again, seems
to be compatible with the core theses of robust realism, particularly with the distinction
between first-order moral claims and metaphysical claims about morality.
This response to the methodological argument and to the previous argument from
epistemic possibility might strike some readers as ad hoc: perhaps this is the thesis that
realists need in the face of these moral challenges, and maybe it is even compatible in
principle with the core ideas of robust realism, but is this methodological picture
independently defensible?Why should we think that there can be no evidence for realism,
understood as a genuinely metaphysical view, other than the kinds of evidence that we
use in moral theory? For instance, should we not expect robust realists to be concerned
with such matters as the supervenience of moral properties on natural properties or our
epistemic access to moral truths, which seem irrelevant for moral theory?
My response here is in two steps. First, questions about supervenience or moral
epistemology can be seen as internal to, or intimately tied with, moral theory or
normative theory more generally. The best evidence for this comes from the very
existence of minimal realism, which deals with such matters despite reducing realism
to a position within first-order moral theory: from a deflationary standpoint, talk of
moral facts and properties is not eliminated but rather reinterpreted as an organic part
of moral theory, and the same applies to the philosophical problems connected with
these metaphysical notions, such as issues about supervenience or epistemic access. Of
course, robust realists are not minimal realists: they reject deflationism about meta-
physical matters and the corresponding internal interpretation of metaethical questions.
But this does not mean that they must treat metaethical questions as somehow isolated
from moral theory, or as responsive to a radically different kind of evidence―to be
settled in the ontology room, as it were. Their disagreement with minimal realists
21 FitzPatrick (2018) might have a similar idea in mind when he says that realism does not entail that “it should
be possible to settle first-order moral questions—perhaps in surprising ways—through some sort of direct
metaphysical discovery (independent of ethical methodologies) of certain non-natural properties in the world.”
(p. 549)
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fundamentally concerns how to interpret the core commitments of realism and is
grounded in a metametaphysical dispute about the nature of truth, facts, etc., but this
disagreement need not lead to any significant difference between how the two parties
arrive at their realist commitments.
Secondly, I acknowledge that not all robust realists will be happy to adopt the
methodological stance sketched above. Some of them might insist that metaphysical
claims about morality are not only distinct from first-order moral claims, but cannot be
settled using only the tools of moral theory, and they might complain that my defense of
robust realism in this paper amounts in effect to watering down its metaphysical and
methodological commitments to the point where it becomes overly similar to minimal
realism.22 Perhaps such realists too can successfully address Bedke’s and Kremm’s
methodological challenge, but I for one am not sure how. In any case, my goal here
has been to articulate one way of responding to the methodological argument against
realism, which aligns with what I take to be an independently plausible version of robust
realism: a view that treats its metaphysical commitments as intimately tied with moral
inquiry and responding to the same kinds of evidence.
6 In Lieu of a Conclusion
The dispute between minimal and robust realism is one of the most intractable in contemporary
metaethics: the two theories seem to agree in their central commitments, but disagree about
how to interpret those commitments. Perhaps due to its very nature as a dispute about how to
understand realism itself, this debate has been marked by dialectical stalemates.
When I started thinking about this paper, I hoped that the moral argument against realism
might be a way to make progress in this debate: it might show that robust realism faces a deep
problem to which minimal realism is immune. Needless to say, I do not think that anymore. I
have argued above that both minimal and robust realists have good answers to all versions of
the moral argument, at least if robust realism is understood as ruling out a methodological gap
between moral and metaphysical inquiry.
If anything, the divide between minimal and robust realism becomes even more elusive
than it already was, if the two sides agree not only on the existence of objective moral facts and
our reliable access to such facts, but also on what kind of evidence can support or undermine
realist commitments, and only disagree about whether those realist commitments have genuine
metaphysical weight. The debate seems to reduce to a metametaphysical dispute about the
nature of truth and facthood, or perhaps about the metasemantics of moral discourse—say,
about the explanatory role of truth and reference relations in the theory of meaning—without
any significant upshot for how metaethical theorizing should be carried out or for the
connection between metaethics and first-order moral theory.
But perhaps this is all as it should be. Just as two people can agree in their scientific realism
even if one is a deflationist about truth and the other is a correspondence theorist, it might be
time for minimal and robust realists to worry less about what divides them, treat each other as
realists in any sense that matters, and focus on their common goals and challenges. I hope to
have shown that the moral argument against realism need not be one of these challenges.
22 David Enoch has expressed this concern to me in personal communication, and so has an anonymous
reviewer.
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